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Abstract 
The regulation of emotions is an ongoing internal process and often a challenge. Current related 
neural models concern the intended control of reactions towards external events, mediated by 
prefrontal cortex regions upon basal emotion processing as in the amygdala. Cognitive strategies 
to regulate emotions in the context of affective disorders or stress reduction, increasingly applied 
in clinical practice, are also related to mindfulness techniques. We questioned their effects on 
neural emotion processing and investigated brain activity during purely internal mental self-
referential processes of making current emotions and self-related cognitions aware. Thirty healthy 
subjects performed a task comprising periods of cognitive self-reflection, of introspection for 
actual own emotions and feelings, and of a neutral condition, while they were scanned with 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Brain activations of twenty-seven subjects during 
emotion-introspection and self-reflection, and also a conjunction of both, were compared with the 
neutral condition. The conditions of self-reflection and emotion-introspection showed 
distinguishable activations in medial and ventrolateral prefrontal areas, in parietal regions and in 
the amygdala. Notably, amygdala activity decreased during emotion-introspection and increased 
compared to ‘neutral’ during self-reflection. The results indicate that already the self-referential 
mental state of making the actual emotional state aware is capable of attenuating emotional 
arousal. This extends current theories of emotion regulation and has implications for the 
application of mindfulness techniques as a component of psychotherapeutic strategies in affective 
disorders and also for possible everyday emotion regulation.  
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Introduction 
We constantly experience a stream of external and internal emotionally meaningful signals 
and events. Awareness of, and the self-regulation in context with these experiences are 
fundamental for coping with the resulting emotional consequences and for managing associated 
behavioral impulses. Main theories concerning the neural underpinnings of emotion regulation 
promote a neural system comprising medial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortical activations that 
exert control over basal emotion processing and emotion generating areas such as within the 
amygdala (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). This is well supported by neuroanatomical evidence (Quirk 
et al., 2003) and by functional neuroimaging (Johnstone et al., 2007; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; 
Phan et al., 2005). This system is also considered to form a basis for functional models of 
emotional disturbances in affective disorders such as depression and anxiety (Bishop, 2009; 
DeRubeis et al., 2008). The model mainly concerns external events and intended regulation, and it 
was derived from respective studies (e.g. Johnstone et al., 2007; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Phan 
et al., 2005). However, unpleasant emotions often arise without an explicit external trigger and are 
experienced as internally generated, which is also the case in depression and anxiety. Further, as 
an initial step for emotion regulation, the actual emotional state has to be registered on the neural 
level and should be aware to the person.  
Neurobiological aspects of self-referential awareness were investigated in the context of 
mindful introspection. Mindfulness comprises the actively maintained awareness and perception 
of present moment external or internal experiences without being judged or evaluated (Brown and 
Ryan, 2003; Stein et al., 2008). Subjects in a mindful state showed activations in medial and 
lateral prefrontal cortex (M/LPFC) areas during affect labeling of presented facial expressions, 
whereby more mindfulness was associated with less amygdalar activation (Creswell et al., 2007) 
indicating less emotional arousal or intensity (Anderson et al., 2003). These and other studies in 
this context (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Farb et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2008) were related to 
external experiences and used cognitive tasks with external stimuli including reaction to them. 
Hence, the tasks themselves could have interfered with the ‘mindful’ state which was being 
attempted to be examined. Likewise, classic emotion regulation studies applied intended cognitive 
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strategies towards external stimuli (Herwig et al., 2007a; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Phan et al., 
2005). Thus, the neural correlates of making oneself aware of purely internal self-referential 
cognitions and emotions, and their relation to the neural model for emotion regulation, remain 
undiscovered and were subject of this investigation.  
We used a paradigm comprising cognitive self-reflection (‘think’: “who am I …”, e.g. 
autobiographical contents) and emotion-introspection (‘feel’: making aware and focusing on 
current emotions and bodily feelings) as well as a neutral control condition (awaiting of the 
neutral distractor) during scanning with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; fig. 1). 
We expected to distinguish neural representations for both self-referential states in medial and 
lateral prefrontal cortex (Esslen et al., 2008; Moran et al., 2006; Northoff et al., 2006), and we 
considered influences on amygdalar activity indicating associations with emotion processing 
(Creswell et al., 2007).  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty healthy subjects (age 23-41, all right-handed, 17 female) were recruited via direct 
address and email-advertisement. All participants were right-handed according to the Annett hand 
preference scale (Annett, 1970). Subjects were pre-assessed with a semi-structured interview 
based on ICD-10 to exclude prior and current neurological or psychiatric illness and intake of any 
medication or other psychotropic substances. Exclusion criteria were pregnancy, excessive 
consummation of alcohol, cigarettes and caffeine, contraindications against fMRI. The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee. All subjects gave written informed consent. After 
scanning, the subjects were systematically asked within a post-experimental briefing about their 
performance of the task. Two subject reported sleepiness and non-concentration in the scanner 
and were therefore excluded from the analysis. One subject showed several movement artifacts 
(sudden head movements of more than 3 mm), so that 3 subjects in total were excluded. The other 
subjects confirmed that they were able to follow the instructions. During the ‘think’-condition, 
they all thought about and reflected on themselves. For the ‘feel’-condition, all subjects reported 
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that they made themselves aware their actual emotions and feelings, and, to a lesser extent, also 
their bodily sensations, whereby the strategies ranged from a more verbal affect labeling to a 
preverbal introspection and awareness. However, we did not document detailed characteristics 
quantitatively. In total, 27 subjects were included in the analysis.  
 
Experimental design 
Subjects underwent fMRI while performing a task comprised of three conditions in random 
order: cognitive self-reflection (‘think’), emotion-introspection (‘feel’), and indifference 
(‘neutral’). The periods for the conditions were initiated by an indicating cue and ended by 
presenting a distracting neutral picture (fig. 1). The subjects were instructed and trained before 
scanning as follows: for the ‘think’-condition: “Think about yourself, reflect who you are, about 
your goals, etc.”, for the ‘feel’-condition: “Feel yourself, be aware about your current emotions 
and bodily feelings”, and for the ‘neutral’-condition: “Do nothing specific, just await the neutral 
picture”. The instructing cues: think ▲, feel▼, neutral ▄, were presented for one second. 
Including this cue, the conditions were of a period of 11880 ms, equivalent to 6 TRs (repetition 
time for the fMRI volumes). The distracting neutral pictures (Lang, 1995), indicating the end of 
each trial were presented for 3960 ms, equivalent to 2 TRs. Then, a baseline period of 8 TRs 
followed until the next trial started. 14 trials of each condition were performed per subject. The 
symbols were intuitively understandable, such that no interfering working memory activity had to 
be used. Intentionally, the task further did not comprise an interfering decisional or motor reaction 
component. The task was programmed with PresentationTM, Neurobehavioral Systems, USA. 
 
Image acquisition 
Imaging was performed with a 3.0 T GE SignaTM HD Scanner (GE Medical Systems, 
Milwaukee, USA, 8-channel head coil). Echo-planar imaging was performed for fMRI (TR/TE 
1980/32 ms, 22 sequential axial slices, whole brain, slice thickness 3.5 mm, 1 mm gap, resulting 
voxel size 3.125×3.125×4.5 mm, matrix 64×64, FOV 200 mm, flip angle 70°). 676 volumes were 
obtained per subject, 16 per trial. The first four volumes were discarded to allow for T2 
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equilibration effects. High-resolution 3-D T1 weighted anatomical volumes were acquired 
(TR/TE 9.9/2.9 ms; matrix size 256×256; 1×1×1 mm resolution, axial orientation) for 
coregistration with the functional data. The stimuli were presented via digital video goggles 
(Resonance Technologies, Northridge, CA). 
 
Data analysis 
FMRI data were analyzed using BrainVoyagerTM QX 1.10.1 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, 
The Netherlands). Preprocessing of the functional scans included motion correction, slice scan 
time correction, high frequency temporal filtering, and removal of linear trends. Functional 
images were superimposed on the 2D anatomical images and incorporated into 3D data sets. The 
individual 3D data sets were transformed into Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) 
resulting in a voxel size of 3×3×3 mm3 and then spatially smoothed with an 8 mm Gaussian 
kernel for subsequent group analysis. Four predictors, representing the three conditions and the 
distractor (think, feel, neutral, presentation neutral picture), were used to build the design matrix. 
Single trials with fMRI signal artifacts of more than threefold mean signal change amplitude (e.g. 
due to head movements) were eliminated. The periods were modeled as epochs using a two-
gamma hemodynamic response function adapted to the applied period duration provided by 
BrainVoyager. 
The fMRI data analysis, based on the general linear model (GLM), comprised the following 
steps: First, fixed effects analyses were calculated separately for each subject for the three 
contrasts comparing the three conditions ‘think versus feel’, ‘think versus neutral’, ‘feel versus 
neutral’, resulting in summary images. The summary images were subjected to second level group 
analyses. Three-dimensional statistical parametric maps were calculated for the group with 
separate subject predictors (fixed effects). The statistical threshold for reporting results was set to 
p<0.001 corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni) together with a cluster threshold of 10 
voxel à 3×3×3 mm. The main interesting contrast for our study question concerned the 
comparison ‘think versus feel’. From the resulting brain areas, we selected the amygdala region 
for additional region-of-interest GLM-analyses in order to differentiate the characteristics of 
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activation: we compared the three conditions with each other, and further ‘think’ and ‘feel’ with 
baseline. This analysis was also performed with an anatomical cubic ROI above the amygdala 
region (middle coordinates x= -20, y= -7, z= -15). Finally, we performed a conjunction of both 
self-referential conditions versus neutral (‘think versus neutral’ & ‘feel versus neutral’) in order to 
reveal those areas which exhibited activation in both conditions.  
 
Questionnaires and correlation analyses 
The subjects completed the Freiburg mindfulness inventory (FMI [Walach et al., 2006], 
German version) and the Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS [Brown and Ryan, 
2003], German version) as self-ratings for trait mindfulness. Further, they completed a self-rating 
scale for depression (SDS [Zung, 1965]). One subject did not complete the questionnaires, one 
subject showed severe artifacts in the clusters (five or more spikes of more than three-fold 
average signal change) such that 25 subjects were included in the correlational analyses. The 
rating scores were correlated with the respective mean beta weights (Pearson’s correlations) of 
clusters with stronger activation during the ‘feel’- or the ‘think’-condition. Therefore, the betas 
for either the ‘feel’ or the ‘think’ condition, both versus baseline, and not the contrast betas, were 
considered. Further, the mindfulness scales were correlated with the depression scale. Also when 
considering the actual discussion concerning fMRI correlation analyses (Mander et al., 2008) and 
fMRI in general (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009), and that a priori formed anatomical ROIs would have 
be an even better basis for correlations, the principles of the presented approach have been 
approved to be fine (Herwig et al., 2007b; Mander et al., 2008).  
 
Results 
Brain activations during emotion-introspection and self-reflection 
The comparison of the conditions of emotion-introspection (‘feel’) and self-reflection 
(‘think’) revealed areas with distinguishable activation concerning both conditions. The ‘feel’-
condition was associated with posterior medial prefrontal activation in the superior frontal gyrus, 
with mid-cingulate cortex activation (Table 1a, Fig. 2a-b), with bilateral activity covering parts of 
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the inferior frontal cortex/premotor/insular regions (fig. S1), and with the bilateral somatosensory 
cortex and the region of the intraparietal sulcus. The ‘think’-condition  was associated with 
activation of anterior prefrontal midline areas, showing a shift to relatively more prominent 
‘think’-related activities the more anterior the areas were (table 1b, fig. 2c-d, large regions were 
presented at a level p<0.00001 corr.). Further, ‘think’ was associated with activation of left-sided 
inferior frontal areas (ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, VLPFC; fig. S1), adjacent to and covering 
speech areas, with dorsolateral prefrontal areas (DLPFC), and also with parietal and occipital 
areas. The left amygdala was found to be activated with the ‘think’-condition and, notably, 
deactivated during the ‘feel’-condition (fig. 3). The ‘feel’-related activity in the amygdala was 
lower compared to the ‘think’ condition (t=-7.7, p<0.000001), compared to the neutral condition 
(t= -4.2, p<0.00002) and it decreased against baseline (t= -8.7, p<0.000001). The ‘think’ 
activation was higher compared to neutral (t=3.5, p=0.0005) but not compared to baseline (t=1.3, 
p=0.21). These findings were qualitatively also confirmed by the analysis of an anatomical ROI 
placement above the amygdala as provided in the supplemental material (fig. S2).  
The MPFC and left VLPFC regions were conjointly active with both conditions versus neutral 
(Table 2, Fig. 4).  
 
Correlation with psychometric measures 
The mean beta weights of the ‘feel’ condition were correlated inversely with the ratings of the 
FMI in those prefrontal midline regions that were more active during ‘feel’ compared to ‘think’ 
(Fig. 2a-b, 9 comparisons in total, 3 significant) and also in the left inferior frontal/premotor 
region (r= -0.41, p=0.044). The beta weights of the ‘think’ condition in those areas showing more 
activation during ‘think’ compared to ‘feel’, correlated inversely with the FMI in the anterior, and 
in trend with the medial midline PFC fig. 2c-d, 9 comparisons in total (thereof 2 significant and 
one trend), and also in the left VLPFC (r= -0.40, p=0.049). Further, the mindfulness scales were 
inversely correlated with the self rating depressiveness scale (SDS, FMI r= -0.507, p=0.01, fig S3, 
MAAS r= -0.510, p=0.01). We found no correlations of brain activity with the SDS scores. 
 
  8
Discussion 
The results provide evidence that both self-related conditions, introspection for one’s own 
present feelings and cognitive self-reflection, induce distinguishable brain activation. A main 
finding was that emotion-introspection was associated with a decreased activation of the left 
amygdala, indicating an attenuating influence on emotional arousal (Anderson et al., 2003; Stein 
et al., 2008). Dorsal midline and left ventrolateral prefrontal regions were activated conjointly 
with both conditions, suggesting a common mediating role for both conditions. The brain 
activations occurred through purely mental effort in naturalistic conditions applicable in every-
day life without interfering experimental behavioral components.  
 
Emotion regulation 
The reduction of amygdalar activation during emotion-introspection is of particular 
importance. The amygdalar nuclei are known to be functionally involved in emotion processing 
(Baxter and Murray, 2002; LeDoux, 2000). Amygdala activation has been reported to be 
associated with fear (LeDoux, 2000; Phelps et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001), but also with 
pleasant emotional stimuli and reward-related processing (Baxter and Murray, 2002; Synofzik et 
al., 2008). These and other findings lend support to the view that attributes the amygdalar function 
to have a more general role in emotion processing such as in emotional arousal and emotion 
intensity without valence specificity (Anderson et al., 2003).  
In the context of emotion regulation, the amygdala was found to be a major recipient of 
activation associated with intended cognitive control of emotions mediated by medial prefrontal 
cortex areas leading to attenuation of amygdala activity (Herwig et al., 2007a; Johnstone et al., 
2007; Phan et al., 2005). This is thought to result in reduced amygdala output towards midbrain 
and brainstem areas and accordingly in less physiological, for instance sympathetic activation 
(Bishop, 2009; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Quirk et al., 2003). Disturbed emotion processing in the 
amygdala is also considered to be a pathophysiological feature of depression and anxiety (Bishop, 
2009; DeRubeis et al., 2008), with implications of an impaired top-down control of amygdala 
activity (Johnstone et al., 2007).  
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Taken together, the amygdala can be regarded as a central processor of emotional arousal and 
intensity and as the target for emotion regulation by cognitive control due to for instance mid-
prefrontal activation. Thus, it is well supported to consider occurring amygdala modulation as a 
neurobiological indicator for emotion regulation. Given these considerations for the amygdala 
function, our finding implicates the ability to attenuate emotional arousal related brain activation 
through the mental process of directing attention and awareness to actual emotions and bodily 
feelings, notably without the conscious intention to regulate emotions. This unintentionality of the 
approach differentiates it from usually applied emotion regulation strategies. Making oneself 
aware of how one feels may lead to an inner distancing from these feelings and thus may 
represent an important strategy for the self-regulation of emotions. This extends current 
neurobiological models of emotion regulation which are based on findings with intentionally 
applied regulation strategies for coping with external stimuli (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). It 
implies that emotion regulation mechanisms may work on an internal basis without external 
stimuli and without the intention to regulate. A core process may be a mid-prefrontal monitoring 
of actual emotions. This has further implications for attempts of treatment aimed at strengthening 
emotion regulation in depression and anxiety as the emotional symptoms in these disorders often 
lack an actual external trigger but can be characterized by internally elevated emotional arousal 
states.  
 
Self-reference 
Prefrontal midline structures represent key regions for self-referential activity (Moran et al., 
2006; Northoff et al., 2006) and emotion regulation (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). We observed a 
ventral-dorsal shift of activation associated with emotion-introspection compared to activation 
associated with cognitive self-reflection: the latter was higher in anterior MPFC regions and 
relatively lower in posterior MPFC regions (fig.2). This supports consideration of a more anterior 
cortical representation of cognitive self-referential processes (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Esslen et 
al., 2008; Moran et al., 2006) in regions that might have developed at later evolutionary stages. 
Further, we found evidence for a lateralized distribution of self-related emotion processing and 
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cognition. Thinking about oneself was associated with activation in the left VLPFC adjacent to 
and comprising speech-related inferior frontal regions. This makes sense as these regions are 
known for inner-speech functions which comprise thinking processes (Siegrist, 1995). Emotion-
introspection activated more posteriorly bilateral inferior frontal/premotor regions and also minor 
parts of the middle insula. This was not fully in line with findings of activity in the relatively 
more anterior VLPFC during affect labeling in states of mindfulness (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 
2007; Creswell et al., 2007; Farb et al., 2007; Lieberman et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2008) but in part 
with interoception associated activity in the insula (Critchley et al., 2004).  
Self-regulation is an essential feature of each living organism. It takes place on several levels, 
with higher levels controlling lower ones, and with an evolutionary development towards more 
conscious higher level processes (Churchland, 2002; Damasio et al., 2000). Introspection with 
awareness for inner feelings and emotions represents a key function within this self-regulating 
cascade. It supports gaining control over lower level circuits and restraining reflexive fear driven 
behavior. Making oneself aware of interoceptive or external signals is also the first step for their 
reappraisal (Gross and John, 2003) and for psychotherapeutic interventions as directing the 
awareness away from for instance painful feelings towards pleasant aspects. However, current 
models of emotion regulation using active regulative strategies may suggest that by just being 
aware of the emotions, representing a first step prior to emotion modulation, one might still be 
indifferent to possible effects on emotions (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Koole, 2009). This is also 
implied by the concept of emotional sensitivity being antecedent to possible emotion regulation 
(Koole, 2009) when temporally unfolding emotional responses. Further, it was suggested that 
emotion regulation primarily occurs towards unwanted emotions (Koole, 2009). What is new now 
is that our data indicate that already directing attention onto the emotional state is capable of 
modifying emotional arousal and intensity related amygdala activation. This can be regarded as 
neurobiological evidence for incidental emotion regulation when we reflect our own emotional 
experience. Incidental emotion regulation previously has been demonstrated in the context of 
external world action (Berkman et al., 2009) and was suggested for internal emotion processes 
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earlier in the context of expressive writing (Pennebaker and Beall, 1986) and is implied by 
concepts of open monitoring meditation (Lutz et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, in this context we also found increased activation of the left amygdala during 
reflecting about oneself compared to the neutral condition. This makes sense when considering 
that thinking about oneself may be accompanied by an emotional evaluation of the contents of 
self-related thoughts, as for instance memories, future goals or cognitive self-evaluation which are 
associated with an emotional impact leading to higher arousal.  
Finally, on the basis of a mindful awareness for interior and exterior stimuli, we are not only 
able to reappraise the meaning of the environment for ourselves, but we may finally also be able 
to modify our attitude towards ourselves or the environment in a well-being and health promoting 
way.   
Apart from the effects of awareness on emotions and cognitive self, it is of interest which 
brain areas may be involved in association with the general induction of these high-level 
mindfulness processes. We found a prominent dorsal medial left prefrontal area to be strongly 
associated with both, the emotion introspection and the cognitive self-reflection (fig. 4). This 
region also has been reported earlier to be involved in emotion regulation (Herwig et al., 2007a; 
Ochsner and Gross, 2005) and in self-referential processes (Northoff et al., 2006). It may be 
assessed in further studies concerning a pivotal role in inducing conscious self-attentive 
processes.  
 
Emotion introspection and clinical implications 
Particularly the self-awareness component of emotion introspection in our task comprised 
elementary features of mindfulness. However, it was of course not representative for mindfulness 
in general. Mindfulness was closely associated with well-being (Brown et al., 2007; Kabat-Zinn, 
1990; Shapiro et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2007) and represents the basis for psychotherapeutic 
concepts such as mindfulness based cognitive therapy for depression (MBCT, Teasdale et al., 
1999) or mindfulness based stress reduction (Grossman et al., 2004), which are increasingly 
applied in psychotherapeutic and psychiatric practice (Allen et al., 2006).  
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Mindfulness has been defined as a receptive attention to and awareness of present experience 
(Brown and Ryan, 2003). A related description of mindfulness components comprised intention, 
attention and a non-judgmental attitude with an awareness for the present moment (Kabat-Zinn, 
1990; Shapiro et al., 2006). Mindfulness can be directed to external or to interoceptive 
experiences. For therapeutic purposes, mindfulness is predominantly applied with a focus on 
interoception (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Teasdale et al., 1999). Our revealed inverse relation of the 
mindfulness scores (FMI and MAAS) with the depressiveness scores (SDS), indicating less 
depressiveness with a higher trait of mindfulness, which supports a relation between mindfulness 
and well-being. Apart from being long practiced within Buddhist meditation (Brown and Ryan, 
2003), the potential impact of mindfulness for daily-life well-being and for treatment of affective 
disorders and stress symptoms has gained increasing attention in the last years (Brown et al., 
2007).  
Its neural underpinnings and possible explanations for its effectiveness have been the subject 
of recent investigations. Ventrolateral prefrontal and midline prefrontal areas and also the 
amygdala were identified to be important components of mindfulness mediating networks 
(Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Creswell et al., 2007; Farb et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2008). 
Subjects in mindful states showed activations in medial and lateral prefrontal cortex during affect 
labeling of presented facial expressions (Creswell et al., 2007). In parallel, amygdalar activation 
as an indicator for emotional arousal (McClure et al., 2004) was diminished during affect labeling 
of external cues with increasing mindfulness (Creswell et al., 2007). Novices in mindfulness 
strategies showed functional connectivity between MPFC and insula (Farb et al., 2007), the latter 
indicating an association with bodily signals (Critchley et al., 2004). Training of mindfulness was 
reported to increase LPFC–insular connectivity during word reading (Farb et al., 2007), with 
complex activation modifications in expert meditators compared to novices (Brefczynski-Lewis et 
al., 2007). Mindfulness related meditation short-term training further lead to improved attention 
and self-regulation in the sense of stress control (Tang et al., 2007).  
In our task, the activation of prefrontal midline areas with distinguishable activation in both 
conditions, ‘think’ and ‘feel’, showed correlations with the trait mindfulness questionnaire FMI. 
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Interestingly, the correlations were inverse, meaning less activation was associated with higher 
traits of mindfulness. This may be explained by less necessary neural resource consumption in 
applying the task in persons being more skillful in mindfulness. This is in line with propositions 
of ‘effortless concentration’ with reduced activation in corresponding neural systems in subjects 
or experts that are skillful in applying mindfulness related meditation (Lutz et al., 2008). In this 
context it appears contra-intuitive on the first sight that apart those midline regions being stronger 
activated with ‘feel’, also the ‘think’ related activation in the more anterior midline regions were 
inversely correlated with the FMI, though the ‘think’ condition was not meant to be associated 
with ‘mindfulness’. However, this may be explained by the suggestion that those people with 
dispositional mindfulness also might need less neuronal effort to focus cognitively on themselves. 
Principally, the correlation analyses findings are to be regarded as preliminary, as they were not 
reflected in the MAAS. That may have been due to a more resources and strength oriented 
character of the FMI and a more deficit oriented view of the MAAS, with possibly the first being 
more sensible to traits in our healthy subjects. On the other hand, affect labeling compared to 
gender labeling under a mindfulness condition showed increased activation in dispositional 
mindfulness (Creswell et al., 2007), which may be due to the active character of that task. In any 
event, training of mindfulness techniques appears to result in neuroplastic adaptations (Farb et al., 
2007) that may also account for treatment effects in, for instance, affective disorders.  
Depression, the most debilitating affective disorder (Lopez and Murray, 1998), has been 
associated with reduced prefrontal control onto downstream areas as the amygdala (DeRubeis et 
al., 2008) and with the need to restore dysfunctional neural networks (Castren, 2005). In 
depressed patients, amygdala activity was found to be increased and prefrontal functions to be 
disturbed (DeRubeis et al., 2008). Mindfulness might for instance interrupt negativity promoting 
feedback loops by decreasing amygdala activity. Training of mindfulness may lead to 
neuroplastically strengthened connections between hereby activated prefrontal areas and 
amygdala with regaining cortical control over dysfunctional limbic emotion circuits. A cognitive 
characteristic of depression is the often quick negative evaluation of oneself and one’s own 
situation, leading to negative ruminating. MBCT can prevent this by building primary non-
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evaluating awareness of oneself and the situation, which can then be the basis for further 
cognitive control and modification of own feelings and for a reappraisal of the actual situation. In 
this context, our finding of an inverse correlation between the trait of mindfulness and actual 
depressed mood indicates a beneficial influence of mindfulness on mood and provides an 
explanation for its effectiveness.  
 
Methodological issues 
Researching mindfulness in the lab with tasks that classically comprise a behavioral 
component such as a motor reaction with an answer to exterior stimuli may deteriorate the 
mindfulness state and may not reflect mindfulness effects directly. In that case, the subject of 
investigation could be disturbed by any control condition. Here, we attempted to investigate 
purely mental self-referential awareness. We therefore intentionally dispensed of using a 
behavioral control. As this might be interpreted as a limitation, other criteria served as a control 
for the plausibility of our results: the identification of predicted brain regions as those revealed in 
earlier studies, the implementation of a neutral condition, the ability to discriminate brain 
activation during the ‘feel’ and the ‘think’ condition, the correlation with psychometric 
mindfulness scales, and the subjects’ self-report after scanning. The advantage of this approach 
consists in applying naturalistic self-referential awareness conditions that can be easily performed 
by untrained persons in everyday life not comprising reactions onto exterior stimuli.  
Another issue is the transfer of the amygdalar modulation due to emotion-introspection from 
the isolated situation in the current study onto stronger, more arousing emotional stimuli and 
situations. In the current study, we analyzed emotion-introspection as a process itself, not during 
the confrontation with emotional stimuli. The application of mindful awareness for own emotions 
as an intended strategy of emotion regulation could be a next step to investigate. Finally, one 
might argue that the ‘think’ task could be experienced as being more difficult compared to the 
‘feel’ task and thus being associated with more arousal. However, the subjects trained the task 
prior to the experiment and could for instance decide for contents to reflect on such that they did 
not have any stress to select the contents. Further, they did not report any difficulties in the task 
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after scanning. And reversely, one might also argue, the ‘think’ condition could lead to focusing 
on cognitions and release from emotional arousal. Anyhow, the central finding of decreased 
amygdala activity in the ‘feel’ condition further was observed also compared to ‘neutral’ and to 
baseline such that it cannot be accounted solely to task difficulties.  
 
Conclusion 
The presented data provide evidence that making oneself aware about one’s own emotions is 
capable of attenuating emotional arousal related brain activation in the amygdala. This effect was 
demonstrated as incidental emotion regulation here, but of course may also be explicitly intended. 
Such, this easily applicable strategy may reduce emotions associated with high arousal such as 
anger, fear or depressiveness. The associated neural pattern may provide an explanation for 
mindfulness associated psychotherapeutic effects that may consolidate neuroplastically and result 
in regaining prefrontal control over dysfunctional emotion circuits. In this context, medial 
prefrontal regions may act as central inductors or mediators of concerning processes representing 
a high level of self-regulation. This extends current models of emotion regulation towards their 
validity also for non-intended regulation of purely internal processes. A practical implication is to 
regulate emotions by non-judgmentally making them aware, an intervention which can be applied 
in each present moment. 
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Legends for Figures and Tables  
 
FIGURE 1. Experimental task. Three conditions were cued: periods of emotion-introspection 
‚feel’ (awareness of actual emotions), of cognitive self-reflection ‚think’ (“who am I …”), and a 
neutral period. Neutral pictures served to indicate the end of the periods and as a distractor. 
Durations indicated in milliseconds. 
FIGURE 2. A-D Results of contrast ‘feel’>’think’. Left column: coronal slices with significant 
regions indicated red and by crosshair, significance level p<0.001 or p<0.00001, both corrected 
(Bonferroni); color bars represent t-values. Middle: time-courses (with standard errors), task-
period between the two grey bars. Right: correlation of mean beta-weights of ‘feel’ or ‘think’ 
condition within the cluster with mindfulness score (FMI). A. Posterior medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC), B. medial cingulate cortex (MCC), C. mid-anterior MPFC and D. anterior MPFC and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). y: Talairach coordinate indicating position of coronal slice.  
FIGURE 3 A-C Activations in amygdala with time courses and graph of beta-weights. A. Fixed 
effects GLM of the contrast ‘feel’>’think’ with separate subject predictors in the amygdala ROI. 
Beta-statistics with mean and standard error. Amygdala activity (yellow circles) during the 
emotion introspection is reduced compared to ‘think’ and ‘neutral’: ‘feel’ vs ‘think’ p<0.000001 
(*), ‘feel’ vs ‘neutral’ p=0.00002 (**), ‘think’ vs. ‘neutral’ p=0.0005, and, not indicated here, also 
compared to baseline (p<0.000001).   
FIGURE 4 Conjunction of ‘feel’ and ‘think’. Conjunction analysis of ‘feel>neutral & 
think>neutral’ with prominent activation in the medial prefrontal cortex as also indicated by the 
time-course.  
TABLE 1. Activated regions with contrast ‘feel’ versus ‘think’. Areas with an extension of more 
than 3000 mm³ on the level p<0.001 corrected are reported with the data of a level of p<0.00001 
corrected and indicated with an asterisk (*). 
TABLE 2 Activated regions in the conjunction analysis of ‘feel>neutral & think>neutral’. 
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TABLE 1. Activated regions with contrast ‘feel’ versus ‘think’.  
Anatomic regions Brodmann area 
Cluster size 
mm3 
Talairach coordinates  
x               y             z 
t-max 
a. ‘feel > think’  
Medial prefrontal cortex R 6/8 (Fig. 2a) 1363 15 -10 57 9.8
Middle cingulate gyrus 24 (Fig. 2b) 2093 6 -3 43 8.4
Inferior frontal gyrus L posterior* 44 1242 -47 -2 11 8.2
Inferior frontal/premotor/insula R* 43/6/13 2401 50 -2 6 9.5
Middle temporal gyrus L 37 1355 -52 -57 -1 10.4
Somatosensory cortex L* 3/7/40 5661 -57 -31 26 12.8
Somatosensory cortex R* 3/7/40 12445 53 -33 29 15.2
Intraparietal sulcus region R* 5/7 6089 15 -47 51 9.8
Intraparietal sulcus region L* 5/7 5951 -16 -53 51 9.0
b. ‘think > feel’ 
Medial prefrontal cortex mid-ant*. 6/8/32 (Fig. 2c) 3298 -9 14 52 11.1
Medial prefrontal cortex anterior* 9 (Fig. 2d) 6988 -7 43 25 12.9
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L 6/8/9* 3181 -31 11 47 9.8
Amygdala/parahippocamp. gyrus L (Fig. 3) 445 -26 -7 -15 7.6
Middle temporal gyrus L 37 1994 -53 -34 -1 -8.7
Inferior frontal gyrus/insula L ant.* 13/45/47 5891 -43 24 2 14.3
Posterior cingulate ctx./precuneus* 23/30/31 9848 -5 -55 18 12.5
Lateral occipital cortex L* 39 2597 -44 -62 23 10.7
Posterior occipital cortex L>R* 18 2431 -22 -87 -5 10.2
 TABLE 2 Activated regions in the conjunction analysis of ‘feel>neutral & think>neutral’. 
Conjunction feel>neutral & think>neutral  
Anatomic regions 
Brodmann 
area 
Cluster size 
mm3 
Talairach coordinates   
x               y             z 
t-max 
Medial prefrontal cortex 8/32 (Fig. 4) 7208 -4 9 47 12.6
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L 44/45/47 916 -44 18 6 6.7
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